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Generally speaking, rates fixed by a commission, to be valid,
must be sufficient to yield a fair return on the "fair value" of the
company's property. The precise meaning of this phrase will not
be discussed in this paper. Not only must the rates, as an aggre.
gate, yield this fair return; but, generally speaking, the rates
fixed on any particular class of the service must yield a fair re-
turn. Thus, when the legislature of Nebraska fixed intrastate
rates which appeared to the Supreme Court to be insufficient to
yield a fair return, the constitutionality of the act was not saved
by the fact that in spite of these rates, the railroads were able to
earn a fair return out of all their traffic, including that in other
states and interstate.' Moreover, the fact that the total intrastate
traffic yielded a sufficient return did not prevent intrastate rates
for the carriage of coal from being held unconstitutional, when
the coal rates yielded little or nothing above the out-of-pocket
cost of carrying that coal. 2 Yet classifications are permissible
that may be broad enough to include at the same rate individual
services the costs of which may vary; "the company cannot claim
the right to earn a net profit from every mile, section, or other
part into which the road might be divided, nor attack as unjust
a regulation which fixed a rate at which some such part would be
unremunerative." 3 But this does not seriously modify the gen-
eral proposition laid dovn in the North Dakota case,4 for in that
very case Justice Hughes remarked that the state's authority is
not "hampered by the necessity of establishing such minute dis-
tinctions that the effective exercise of the rate-making power be-
comes impossible. It is not bound to prescribe separate rates for
every individual service performed, but it may group services by
fixing rates for classes of service."
There are, however, more serious qualifications to the doctrine
that each class of rates must pay its own cost plus fair return.3
1 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 540-542, 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 431, 432
(1898).
2 Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 35 Sup. Ct. 429
(1915).
3 St Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Gill, 156 U. S. 649, 15 Sup. Ct. 484
(1895).
4 Supra note 2.
5 Such a rate will be referred to hereafter as "the cost rate." The term
is convenient though not accurate, unless the fair return is calculated on
cost rather than on the hodge-podge known as "fair value." Moreover,
the term assumes that there is such a thing as "the cost" of one class of
transportation as distinct from that of the other classes. Such an assump-
tion is believed to be false. Certain of the costs can be segregated and
said, with accuracy, to be caused by the class of traffic in question. These
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An order to run a new train, although it would have to be run
at a loss, was held valid where it appeared that "adequate re-
muneration would result from the general operation of the rates
in force, even allowing for any loss occasioned by the running of
the extra train in question." '1 An order to continue the opera-
tion of a line of a traction company was also held valid, although
it appeared impossible to continue it without loss, where, from
the state of the evidence it did not appear that the company would
obtain less than a fair return from its total business.- On the
other hand, an order to continue running certain trains was held
invalid, partly on the ground that the railroad was on the verge
of insolvency." It seems to follow from these cases that there
may be circumstances in which service at rates below cost may
be required constitutionally, particularly if the loss is made up
by rates above cost on other services; but that the mere fact that
the less-than-cost rates are balanced by other rates at more than
cost, is not sufficient to justify the former; and further, rates will
be considered to be less-than-cost, even if they yield something
more than out-of-pocket costs.
In this paper I shall not attempt to discuss at any length the
particular grounds of social expediency which have been held to
justify rates below or above cost; but merely to point out some
consequences of the Supreme Court's recognition that there may
be such grounds. Before passing on to grounds justifying, or
even requiring as a constitutional matter, rates above cost, it is
well to enumerate two other circumstances in which rates below
cost, as that term is defined in the North Dakota case, may be
justified.
The principle of making concessions to traffic that "will not
bear" a higher rate is familiar. These concessions, however, do
not require rates on other traffic above cost, in any realistic deft-
are the so-called "out-of-pocket" or "separable" costs. There remain, how-
ever, the joint costs, which must be incurred if any traffic at all is to b3
taken, but which are not added to by any one class. These must be met
by the total traffic, and the rate making body can, within limits, and
must apportion them to the various classes in some manner. But the
choice of the precise measure of apportionment is necessarily "arbitrary"
in the sense that it is not a reflection of some objective fact. The rate-
making body must either make the apportionment blindly, or else base
it on grounds of social policy concerning the relative desirability of the
cheapening of this rather than of that class of service. However, for
purposes of discussion, it will be assumed in the text of this article that
there is such a thing as "the cost" of each class of traffic.
6Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. North Carolina Corp. Comnission, 206
U. S. 1, 27 Sup. Ct. 585 (1907).
7Puget Sound Traction, L. & P. Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574, 37
Sup. Ct. 705 (1917).
s mississippi R. R. Commission v. Mobile & Ohio R. R., 2414 U. S. 033,
37 Sup. Ct. 602 (1917).
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inition of the term, in order to avoid a loss to the company. In
making these concessions, the distinction between out-of-pocket
and joint costs, so contemptuously dismissed by Justice Hughes
in the North DakoWc case, must be borne in mind. If a particular
class of traffic can not be secured except at a rate lower than the
out-of-pocket cost of carrying that traffic, then the concession of
that rate does indeed inflict a loss on the company, unless the
burden on other customers is higher than it otherwise need be.
The out-of-pocket cost (by definition) would be saved if that
class were not carried, while the gross revenue lost by not carry-
ing it would be less than the saving. But if, by making a con-
cession in the rate, and only by making the concession, a class of
traffic can be secured which will contribute something, however
little, above its out-of-pocket costs, then the concession lightens
rather than adds to the burden that must be imposed on the re-
maining traffic if the company is to be saved from loss. Failure
to obtain the traffic would save only its out-of-pocket costs, and
would sacrifice a revenue somewhat more than this saving. If
the company can obtain this revenue, then part of the joint costs
can be defrayed by it, and a smaller part of them than otherwise
need be met by the rates charged to the remaining traffic. By
definition the joint costs are those which would remain the same
whether this particular traffic were carried or not. Hence it is
presumably a benefit to the class discriminated against, as well as
to the class favored, to establish this particular kind of less-than-
cost rates.8a
sa It is true that if "cost" be defined as a mathematical division of joint
costs among all the traffic (plus of course the out-of-pocket or separable
cost of each), then the classes not favored by the concession will be pay-
ing more than their "cost"; but this is merely because the division that
would be made if the favored traffic were eliminated would make the sup-
posed "cost" to the unfavored traffic higher than it appears to be when
the rates are such as to bring the favored traffic into the accounting. This
can be made clearer by an oversimplified illustration. Suppose there are no
out-of-pocket costs, and the total costs are, say, one hundred. Fifty units
of traffic A will be taken, even if the rate is as high as two per unit; no
more units of A will be taken under any rate. Twenty-five units of
traffic B will be taken if a rate of one per unit is charged for it, but it
will not move at a higher rate. Now if rates are fixed at one per unit
for B and one and a half for A, the company will meet its entire cost;
but the nominal cost for each unit of either kind is one hundred divided
by seventy-five, or one and a quarter; hence A is nominally paying more
than cost, by reason of the concession to B. But if no concession were
made to B, there would be no units of B to consider, and the cost per unit
of A would be one hundred divided by fifty, or two. And a rate of two
would be required. But each unit of A, while in this case paying no more
than cost, would be paying more than if the concession were made, though
in that case paying more than the nominal cost. The concession enables
a reduction to be made in the rate charged A, although the "cost' falls
even more than does the rate.
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There is another class of cases where a rate below cost may
be tolerated. That is when predictions as to the earnings likely
to be yielded by a particular schedule of rates prove inaccurate.
In these cases there may be delays during which the rates law-
fully in force yield less than a fair return. This of course gives
the company grounds for insisting on a revision of the rates up-
wards, as a matter of constitutional right; but until the revision
is made, the customers are entitled to be served at the rates
temporarily in force.
Let us next turn to rates higher than cost. We have seen that
the requirement of specified service at rates below cost may de-
pend for its validity, in part at least, on whether the company
is making up the deficiency out of other branches of the traffic.
If it is, rates on that other traffic must of mathematical necessity
exceed cost. Would it be constitutional to reduce them? The
question was raised in Groesbeck v. Duluth, S.S. & A. Ry.,Q affirm-
ing a decree of the District Court which enjoined the enforce-
ment of a two-cent passenger law on the ground that it was con-
fiscatory. The officials of the state alleged that the district judge
committed certain specific errors in his calculations, one of which
is dealt with by Justice Brandeis, speaking for the entire court,
as follows :10
"Fouth: The further contention is made that the sleeping
car, parlor car and dining car services should be treated as separ-
ate operations; that they should be charged with their proportion
of specific and general expenses but credited only with the
amounts received from charges for the specific service; and that
no part of the apparent loss on these services should be taken
into consideration in determining whether the two-cent fare is
confiscatory. In support of this contention it is urged that these
services were voluntary; that the law (Michigan Public Acts of
1875, No. 38) permits railroads to make special charges for these
services 'in addition to the regular passenger fares allowed by
law,' and that travellers in day coaches must not be allowed to
suffer because a railroad fails to make these services compensa-
tory. On American railroads of importance these services have
been well-nigh universal for more than a generation; and the
charges for them are substantially uniform throughout the coun-
try. It would be practically impossible, as it would be obviously
unwise, for a railroad like the plaintiff's either to discontinue the
services or to increase the charges to cover the cost of the par-
ticular service on its line. It is inconceivable that the legisla-
ture of Michigan should have intended in enacting the two-cent
fare law to deny to its citizens these customary facilities; and
for the purpose of determining whether the act is confiscatory
the passenger service including these facilities must be treated
as a whole. The fact alleged that these facilities are used mainly
by interstate travellers is immaterial."
9 250 U. S. 607, 40 Sup. Ct. 38 (1919).10 Supra note 9, at 613-614, 40 Sup. Ct. at 41.
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It seems, then, that a rate above cost may be required on one serv-
ice to enable the company to make up the losses it would other-
wise incur in rendering certain other essential services at a rate
below cost.
Rates above cost may also occur (although not constitutionally
required) in other circumstances. One instance is analogous to
one already noted in the case of rates below cost-namely the
case of erroneous prediction. A rate may be fixed for the pur-
pose of yielding to the company a particular "fair return," and
then turn out to yield much more. This fact may result in an
eventual reduction, but until that time it is the lawful rate.
Then again, a rate may be tolerated, or even required, above
cost, to avoid certain forms of injurious competition. In Re
Street Railroad Rates," the District of Columbia Commission fixed
uniform fares for the two companies operating in Washington,
although it recognized that this would give one of them more than
a fair return. To reduce its fare, in the Commission's opinion,
would tend to ruin its competitor, which could not afford to charge
a lower fare. In another case the Public Service Commission of
the state of Washington, acting under the authority of a statute,
actually ordered a tramp steamer to increase its rates to a parity
with those of the regular shipping company with which it com-
peted in Puget Sound, although the lower rates which the tramp
had been charging yielded it a fair return.12 Some of the con-
cessions already discussed, in favor of traffic which will not move
otherwise, even though beneficial to other traffic on the railroad
which makes the concession, may be equally injurious to the rail.
road with which it competes and to all the customers of the latter
road. That road may in turn have to reduce the rate for that
traffic still more. This sort of cut-throat competition is recog-
nized as beneficial to no one in the long run. By the Act of 1920
Congress conferred on the Interstate Commerce Commission
power to prevent it by establishing minimum as well as maximum
rates. 13 The power might conceivably be used, as the similar
power was used by the Washington Commission in the case of
the tramp steamer, to force one railroad to charge a rate above
cost on certain traffic.
There may be cases where a rate is sufficiently remunerative,
but the service is overcrowded and hence inferior to what it
might be. An increase in the rate may reduce the crowding, by
discouraging unnecessary use of the service, and may at the same
21Pu. UTIL. REP. (D. of C.) 1921 E, at 13.
12Public Service Commission v. Garfield, PuB. UTIL. REP. (Wash.) 1916
B, at 835.
1' For some of the possibilities following the conferring of this power,
see the remarks of Justice Brandeis in United States v. Illinois Central
R. R., 263 U. S. 515, 525, 44 Sup. Ct. 189, 193 (1924).
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time increase the company's return (the higher rate more than
offsetting the lessened demand). The new rate would then be
above cost, but nevertheless might be justified. The New York
Public Service Commission for the Second District justified the
introduction of a telephone toll charge between the cities of Johns-
town and Gloversville "as a means of regulating the traffic rather
than as a revenue producer solely." 14
In other cases, instead of overcrowding the service, the com-
pany may either have to refuse to serve new applicants, or else
h1ave to -ration its supply in some manner among all applicants,
or in some manner extend its supply. Where the supply can be
increased as cheaply as it was originally produced, there is no
problem; but where additions can be made only at a greater cost,
it may be thought inexpedient or unjust to require the company
to increase it. If rates were not regulated, the company would
be likely under these conditions to increase its rates to the point
where the excess demand is discouraged; it would lose nothing
by destroying that part of the demand which it cannot meet.
But by charging these higher prices, it might well be that it would
receive more than a fair return. Yet in the case of a regulated
utility that may be the best way out. This may well be another
instance where social expediency may require the charging of a
rate above cost. This is not true in all cases. Even private
companies sometimes prefer to maintain a stable price policy
even though it would be possible at times for them to raise their
prices and still get all the orders they can fill. Frequently in
the case of irrigation companies it is thought better to keep the
rate down and then permit the customers to be served in some
order of priority determined by the commission. 0 In the case
of cars for the carriage of coal, our policy is to fix rates at which
the demand for cars at some seasons exceeds the available supply.
This gives rise to controversies as to the number to which each
mine is entitled.16 The problem arises in the case of natural
gas.17 It gave rise to the unsuccessful attempt of the legislature
of West Virginia to accord priority to domestic consumers over
those in other states.- The problem of rationing was acute dur-
14 Edwards v. Glen Telephone Co., PuB. UTm. RrP. (N. Y.) 1916 B, at
940, 965.
26 For a case of this kind see Ferrasci v. Empire Water Co., PUB. UTIL.
REP. (Calif.) 1915 B, at 438, 447-448.
16 See United States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533, 44 Sup. Ct 610
(1924); Avent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127, 45 Sup. Ct. 34 (1924); Ber-
wind-White Coal Mining Co. v. United States, 9 Fed. (2d) 429 (E. D.
Pa. 1925); United States v. Koenig Coal Co., 46 Sup. Ct. 092 (192G);
United States v. Michigan Portland Cement Co., 46 Sup. Ct. 295 (1926).
,7For an interesting discussion see (1918) 31 HAnv. L. Ruv. 1025.
38 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
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ing the war, when prices of many commodities were fixed at a
point sufficiently low to cause the demand greatly to exceed the
supply.19
While social expediency may dictate a cost rate in many cases
even if that necessitates priority regulation, it does not necessarily
dictate one in all cases. There is one case in particular in which
the cost rate does not seem the best way out. When there are
several railroads or several plants of any sort all furnishing parts
of the total output of the same service, and all producing at dif-
ferent costs, a uniform rate for all the plants may be thought
desirable. If we assume that the plants with the lower costs
cannot increase their output except at costs equal to those of
the most expensive, and that the outputs of the latter are essen-
tial, what would be the advantage of having different prices for
each plant? Every buyer would then prefer to buy his supply
at the low-cost plant. But its output is limited, and some of the
buyers would have to buy elsewhere at a higher price.1"' The
benefit of the lower prices would be confined to those buyers who
were permitted to buy at the low-cost plants.20  A uniform rate
(sufficient to yield a fair return to the highest cost plant that
we need to keep going) would equalize matters among the var-
ious classes of buyers. But it presents other problems.
These other problems arise whenever we have rates other than
cost rates. Where rates above cost are fixed solely to offset rates
below cost on other services rendered by the same company, the
ground of social expediency dictating the higher rates is based
on the desire to give the company the additional revenue result-
ing. In such a case, the fact that the company gets the additional
revenue from these rates presents no problem. Conversely, when
a service which cannot pay its way is nevertheless required for
some reason of social policy, but where its requirement is justi-
fied only because the loss is offset by other rates which exceed
cost, there is no problem. These two cases of rates above and
below cost respectively do not result in the company receiving
either more or less than the fair return that is justified by other
considerations of policy. The matter is different, however, when
19 At the time a very penetrating discussion of the problem appeared in
the New Republic. Alvin Johnson, What Priority Means (June 30, 1917)
vol. 11, p. 237.
:La If, however, the plants with the low costs can meet the demands of
these buyers, we may have the situation already dealt with, where com-
petitors might be ruined unless the low-cost plants charge the same rate
as the high-cost ones.
20 In State ex rel. Sagness v. Hawk Creek Telephone Co., 120 Minn. 395,
139 N.W. 711 (1913), the relator was denied connection with one line
of a local telephone company, which was already filled to capacity, but
offered connection with another line from which he could obtain the same
service, but the rate for which (since it cost more) was higher. He was
denied relief against the company.
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rates are fixed below cost because of failure to predict accurately
the return to be derived from them, or when they are fixed above
cost because of inaccurate predictions in the opposite direction,
or when they are fixed above cost to avoid cut-throat competition,
to avoid overcrowding the service, or to avoid the necessity of
rationing the supply. Where the rates are fixed above or below
cost because of erroneous predictions, there is no social purpo3e
in the deviations from cost; the purpose of fixing the rates in
question was to give the company what was adjudged to be its
fair return. That purpose has been frustrated in part, due
neither to the fault nor to the merit of the company or its officials."'
There is no reason why the stockholders should suffer or take
advantage of the mistake. In case the rates turn out to be in-
sufficient, it would seem only fair to permit the company either
to add the loss to the rate base on which a fair return is to be
calculated in the future, or else to amortize the loss out of rates
for a number of years. This position was taken by the Michigan
Commission in the case of Re City of South Hamcn. -' The same
reasoning applies to gains made by the company above a fair re-
turn when the error was the other way. There is no reason why
these gains should not be treated as a return of so much capital,
and deducted from the rate base on which the fair return there-
after is to be calculatedY3
In the above cases, the deviation of the rates from cost was
temporary. In the other cases of rates fixed above cost for one
or another ground of social policy, there was no error to be
cured. The condition may go on indefinitely. The higher rate
is promoting the purpose for which it was established-i.e., pro-
tecting the competitor, or discouraging the use of an overcrowded
service, or acting as a selective device to discourage bids for the
service which cannot be accepted. In none of the cases was the
purpose to enrich the company, yet such is the incidental effect,
21 It is not intended to deny in this article the desirability of giving the
company a chance to earn more if it succeeds in keeping down cozt-, and
less if it fails. See, however, CHAS. S. MORUGn, IEGUYWTIJN %:-D THur
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1923) 'A16-319. The limit. abave and
below which that return could be allowed to go, however, might be statel,
and rates yielding anything within that belt be dcmcd a- includcd in the
term "fair return." Then what is stated in the text would apply only in
case the yield of the rates turned out to be above or bklow thoz e limitz.
22 PUB. UTL. REP. (Mich.) 1923 E, at 694. A very persuasive plea for
this policy is made by A. H. Ryall in The Prbiciple of R pration Apptcd
to Rate Regulation (1925) 23 MICH. L. Rmv. 233.
23 Reserves for equalizing returns from year to year ave also desirable
for avoiding the necessity of a constant alteration of the rate base. See
JOHN BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1925) 293-203;
and discussion of the proposition to establish such reserves by the California
Commission in Re Southern California Edison Co., Pun. UTiL. IlcP. (Calif.)
1921 D, at 65, 80-S2.
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unless some further action is taken. If some corrective can be
adopted to remove this incidental effect without defeating the
other purposes, that corrective cannot be said necessarily to be
counter to grounds of social policy. The two correctives that
suggest themselves are the reduction of the rates on other serv-
ices rendered by the same company to less than cost, and the
public appropriation of the surplus above the fair return.
We have seen that the receipt of rates above cost on some
services has at times been treated by the Supreme Court as a
circumstance which justifies the requirement of certain other
services that cannot be rendered except at a loss. It is suggested
that this might be carried further. If there are some services
which can be rendered at cost rates, but whose cheapening would
be of public advantage if not done at the unfair expense of any-
one else, why should not some of these services be ordered to be
cheapened, provided the loss is made up from other rates which
will be kept up in any event, whether this cheapening is done or
not? If this suggestion were carried through, the social purpose
in maintaining some of the rates above cost would still be served,
and only the incidental and unsought effect of giving the com-
pany more than a fair return would be avoided.
Would such a procedure be upheld by the Supreme Court? At
first glance it seems to violate the doctrine of the North Dakota
case. Yet if the Court were to be convinced of the desirability
of the action, it could be sustained without reversing that case.
Justice Hughes's doctrine could be confined to the facts which
very likely existed in the North Dakota case, and on the assumed
existence of which he based his reasoning. "It does not aid the
argument," he said, "to urge that the state may permit the carrier
to make good its loss by charges for other transportation. If
other rates are exorbitant, they may be reduced. Certainly, it
could not be said that the carrier may be required to charge ex-
cessive rates to some in order that others might be served at a
rate unreasonably low. That would be but arbitrary action."
Note the assumption of this argument, that the rates on other
services that yield more than a fair return are for that reason
"exorbitant" or "excessive." That assumption is not always true.
It was evidently thought not to be true by the Supreme Court
itself in the Atlantic Coast Line,24 in the Puget Sound26 and in
the Gi'oesbeck'2' cases, as we have already noted. It was thought
not to be sound in the Dayton-Goose Cree - 7 case, to which we
shall turn presently. It is also difficult to see why it is sound in
24 Supra note 6.
25 Supra note 7.
26 Supra note 9.
27 Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct.
169 (1924).
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the cases we are discussing, where a social purpose is promoted
by fixing certain rates above cost. In the North Dakota case
itself, it may very well have been a correct assumption. Nothing
appears there to the contrary. But obviously the reasoning has
no application where the carrier is permitted to make up its loss
on the transportation of some goods by rates for other trans-
portation that are not "exorbitant," but that nevertheless yield
more than a fair return.
This solution of the problem may, however, be vetoed by future
decisions of the court. And it can only be applied where there
are classes of service whose rate can be reduced without en-
countering the same grounds of social policy that dictated the
higher rates whose incidental excess earnings we are trying to
distribute. The field for the application of this policy is there-
fore strictly limited. The other solution is the public appropria-
tion of the surplus above the fair return. The Transportation
Act of 1920 adopted this policy as to one-half of the surplus earn-
ings. It was argued that this "recapture" provision was uncon-
stitutional, partly on the ground that if a rate was fixed which
was reasonable to the shipper, that rate must likewise be rea-
sonable to the railroad in its yield, and consequently that to de-
prive it of the incidental earnings resulting was confiscatory.
The opponents of the act failed to recognize that there might be
grounds of social policy for making the shipper pay a higher
rate, which did not make it essential for the railroad to keep the
incidental proceeds. This distinction, however, was clearly rec-
ognized in the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered in 1924
by Chief Justice Taft.2-  That case established the constitution-
ality of the "recapture" method of dealing with the surplus earn-
ings of a railroad which result from rates that are fixed for cer-
tain reasons of policy at a point higher than that required by
those reasons of policy which are embodied in the formula, "fair
return on fair value."
This procedure adds a new element to the conception of a "pub-
lic utility." Hitherto, the principal burdens that could be laid
upon "businesses affected with a public use," and not upon other
businesses, were the requirements that all must be served (to
the limit of the facilities), and served adequately, at rates which
the legislature or a commission could establish (subject to court
review)-the rates so established to be not exorbitant and not
unduly discriminatory. The legal discussion of what sorts of
business are "affected with a public use," although possibly con-
fused and fumbling, has really centered on the underlying prob-
lem of what businesses would be in a position, if unregulated, to
cause serious harm by refusing service, or by charging unduly
28 Supra note 27.
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discriminatory or exorbitant prices. A business may be thought
to require control in some of these respects but not in all. The
state may control the rates of an insurance company, even though
the company may refuse to insure any particular applicant.!-D
Under the recapture provision of the Act of 1920, a railroad
which is not offending in any of the conventional ways against
which the power to regulate has been sustained, may neverthe-
less have such of its earnings as exceed six per cent on the
"value" of its property, impressed with a trust for the benefit
of the government. Such at least is the provision of the statute.
The Court does not preclude itself, in the Dayton-Goose Creek
case, from holding in a particular case that the recapture is
invalid if it leaves the company less than a "fair return" (rather
than a rigid six per cent) on the "value."
Control of a business "affected with a public use" may include,
then, control by "recapturing" excess earnings. May not the
concept of property "affected with a public use" be gradually
broadened to include such businesses as require this kind of con-
trol even when it would not be desirable to reduce the prices of
their products? It is at least conceivable that when the courts
take to analyzing the economic functioning of property rights, if
they ever do take to analyzing it, they will find a wide field of
such rights the economic yield of which might well go in part
into the public treasury by "recapture." Taxation would then
be applied to many forms of property in which the conventional
canons of the tax writers will be discarded. Instead of those
canons, the question will be asked, not what proportion of the
net income should be taken, but by how much does the net income
exceed a fair return on the "fair value" of the property (the
"fair value" being determined as in a rate case). Then the bal-
ance over the fair return will be appropriated, in great part, by
the government.
But without any conscious use of the concept of "public util-
ity," we have already used for a short time a form of taxation
which applied somewhat similar principles-namely, the "ex-
cess profits tax." In administering that tax, it became essential
to define what the "investment" was, eight per cent of which was
exempt from the tax. It was argued that the company was en-
titled to deduct eight per cent on the "value" of its capital assets,
not merely on their cost. This was in a case where the original
cost was very much the lower figure. It was further argued that
unless the exemption in the statute be interpreted as applying
to value rather than cost, the statute was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court decided against the company on both points in
29 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612
(1914).
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La Belle IRon Works v. Uited States.O Yet if the Court applies
the recapture principle, and extends it, while it will be adminis-
tering substantially the same tax, it will most likely hold that
what is subject to recapture is the excess above a fair return on
the "rate-making valuation." If the clause were specifically
amended to specify "fair return on the actual cost" instead of
"'six per cent on the value," a recapture which left the company
little more than a fair return on cost would be held invalid in
case the rate making "value" were substantially greater. The
Court has often enough and clearly enough expressed its opinion
that the "value" on which rates must be permitted to yield a
fair return is not actual cost, although what that "value" is or
can be, consistent with the state's power to reduce net earnings
at all, no mortal man may know. An extension of the recapture
principle, then, if viewed through the rate-making lens, would
limit the principle in such a way that the company might be con-
stitutionally protected in keeping much more than a fair return
on cost; if viewed through the lens of the La Becle Iron case, the
company would be accorded protection of no more than a fair
return on cost. Whether the attempt to focus both lenses on the
same object may some day lead some judicial oculist to attempt
to straighten the Court's vision on the valuation problem re-
mains to be seen.
30 256 U. S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct. 528 (1921).
